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Do distributive benefits increase voter participation? This article argues that the government delivery of distributive aid
increases the incumbent party’s turnout but decreases opposition-party turnout. The theoretical intuition here is that
an incumbent who delivers distributive benefits to the opposing party’s voters partially mitigates these voters’ ideological
opposition to the incumbent, hence weakening their motivation to turn out and oust the incumbent. Analysis of individual-
level data on FEMA hurricane disaster aid awards in Florida, linked with voter-turnout records from the 2002 (pre-
hurricane) and 2004 (post-hurricane) elections, corroborates these predictions. Furthermore, the timing of the FEMA aid
delivery determines its effect: aid delivered during the week just before the November 2004 election had especially large
effects on voters, increasing the probability of Republican (incumbent party) turnout by 5.1% and decreasing Democratic
(opposition party) turnout by 3.1%. But aid delivered immediately after the election had no effect on Election Day turnout.
Do government distributive benefits increasevoter turnout? Scholars have long argued thatnon-means-tested entitlement programs cause
increased turnout among their beneficiaries. For exam-
ple, the recipients of agricultural subsidies (Wolfinger
and Rosenstone 1980), Social Security (Campbell 2002),
and Medicare and veterans’ benefits (Mettler and
Stonecash 2008; Verba et al. 1993) exhibit higher turnout
rates than nonrecipients. At the aggregate level, counties
and congressional districts respond to increased distribu-
tive spending with higher turnout (Ansolabehere and
Snyder 2006; Matsubayashi and Wu 2009). A commonly
hypothesized explanation for this positive turnout effect
is Lipset’s classic argument that one’s decision to turn out
depends upon the perceived “relevance of government
policies to the individual” (1960, 190). Under this the-
ory, as articulated by subsequent scholars (e.g., Campbell
2002; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980), the delivery of
distributive benefits motivates recipients to protect their
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stake in these spending programs by participating in pol-
itics through voting.
However, there is reason to question whether this
positive relationship between distributive benefits and
turnout should hold for all voters, regardless of their par-
tisanship. A voluminous literature on political behavior,
beginning with The American Voter, argues that voters’
responses to political events are conditioned by their par-
tisanship. Voters’ partisan identification serves as a “per-
ceptual screen through which the individual tends to see
what is favorable to his partisan orientation” (Campbell
et al. 1960, 133). Partisanship affects voters’ subjective
judgments, such as their approval of presidential perfor-
mance (Bartels 2002), as well as objective evaluations,
such as assessments of the economy (Gerber and Huber
2009, 2010).
This article draws upon the political participa-
tion theory described by Lipset (1960), Wolfinger and
Rosenstone (1980), and Campbell (2002), revising and
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extending this classic theory to account for voters’ parti-
san biases in their retrospective evaluations. This article’s
theory preserves these authors’ original intuition that the
recipients of distributive benefits are motivated to vote in
order to protect their future benefits. But the theory also
revises this argument by accounting for voters’ partisan
biases in deciding whether to turn out. The theory pre-
dicts that distributive spending can affect voter turnout
in opposite directions, depending on the voter’s parti-
sanship: voters who share the incumbent’s partisanship
respond to benefits with increased turnout. But voters
who align with the challenger’s party respond to benefits
with decreased turnout.
The intuition behind this asymmetric result is as fol-
lows. Each voter has an ideological preference for either
the left- or right-wing party, but voters also generally
prefer politicians who prioritize the delivery of distribu-
tive benefits. Hence, a voter who receives benefits from
a same-party incumbent will respond with increased
turnout in order to enhance the probability of reelect-
ing the incumbent. By contrast, a voter who identifies
with the challenger’s party prefers to expel the incumbent
for ideological reasons. But if the incumbent delivers ben-
efits to this opposite-party voter, the voter may respond
by not turning out to vote, as the incumbent’s distributive
generosity has mitigated the voter’s motivation to oust
the incumbent.
Borrowing from the retrospective voting literature
(e.g., Ferejohn 1986; Fiorina 1981), this article’s theory
considers voters who retrospectively judge the incum-
bent’s distributive policy. The voter observes the incum-
bent’s disaster aid policy and evaluates the incumbent’s
prioritization of disaster aid. Hence, an incumbent who
delivers pre-election aid develops a reputation as being
likely to deliver such aid in the future, thus enhancing
her favorability among voters regardless of partisanship.
If the incumbent is right-wing, then this enhanced rep-
utation may convince a left-wing voter to simply abstain
from voting, as the incumbent’s superior record on dis-
aster aid has weakened the voter’s overall aversion to the
incumbent and motivation to oust her.
Empirically, this article tests these theoretical pre-
dictions using detailed records of 1.1 million households
that applied for Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) disaster assistance during the summer 2004 hur-
ricane season, just prior to the November 2004 pres-
idential election. I linked these FEMA applications to
Florida voter registration and past turnout records. By
comparing individual voters’ turnout in the 2002 (pre-
hurricane) and 2004 (post-hurricane) elections, I find
that the awarding of FEMA aid increases Republican (in-
cumbent party) voters’ turnout while decreasing Demo-
cratic (challenger party) turnout inNovember 2004. I also
analyze FEMA aid awarded at the voting precinct level,
finding that the awarding of FEMA aid causes a statisti-
cally significant increase in President Bush’s vote share in
November 2004.
Exploiting variation in the timing of the delivery of
FEMA aid helps to establish the causal direction of this ef-
fect. First, FEMA awards delivered in the week just before
the November 2004 election had an abnormally large ef-
fect, increasing the probability of Republican (incumbent
party) turnout by 5.1% and decreasing Democratic (op-
position party) turnout by 3.1%. Second, several placebo
tests investigate whether FEMA aid delivered immediately
after the November 2004 election is statistically related to
Election Day turnout. The placebo tests find that post-
election aid has no effect on ElectionDay turnout. Hence,
the analysis of pre- and post-election aid supports the
causal argument that FEMA aid affects voter turnout, not
vice versa.
This article proceeds as follows. The first section in-
tuitively describes the article’s theory and explains the
two testable predictions of this theory concerning the
effect of disaster aid on voter behavior. The online ap-
pendix presents a formal model of this theory. The sec-
ond section describes the process by which FEMA dis-
tributed disaster aid to hurricane victims in 2004. The
third section conducts several tests of the formal model’s
predictions using individual-level data on FEMA aid
applications, linked to individual voter-turnout records
and precinct-level election results. The final section ad-
dresses the causal direction of the finding and robustness
checks.
A Theory of Disaster Aid and Voter
Turnout
This section intuitively presents this article’s theory and
explains the two testable predictions of the theory. Ad-
ditionally, the online appendix presents a more detailed
formal model that derives these two predictions. Because
of space constraints, this section simply summarizes the
key features and assumptions of themodel and informally
explains the intuitive logic of the theory.
Politicians’ Ideologies and Types
To set up the theory, suppose the incumbent presi-
dent is ideologically right-wing, and the challenger can-
didate is left-wing. This illustrative setup mirrors the
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empirical context of this article, which examines the 2004
election with a Republican incumbent and a Democratic
challenger.
The theory considers two types of politicians: those
who prioritize disaster aid and those who do not. A presi-
dent might not prioritize disaster aid because she instead
focuses her attention and public resources on other pol-
icy issues. The full formal model assumes that Nature
randomly chooses each politician’s type, and these two
politician types are distinguished by their utility prefer-
ences over delivering disaster aid. A politician’s type is
independent of her ideology.
Voters do not become aware of a politician’s type un-
til they observe the president making a policy choice on
disaster aid. Hence, having observed the incumbent in
office during the previous term, voters develop certainty
about the incumbent’s type, but they remain uncertain
about the challenger’s type. As an illustrative example,
voters might have been uncertain about President Bush’s
type prior to September 2005. But after the intense public
scrutiny of FEMA’s response to Hurricane Katrina, voters
updated their beliefs and developed stronger and more
specific views about the Bush administration’s prioritiza-
tion of hurricane relief efforts. In this sense, an incumbent
with a reputation for delivering disaster aid enjoys a “va-
lence advantage,” independent of voters’ preferences over
candidates on the ideological dimension, as modeled by
Groseclose (2001).
Voter Interests
Following Dixit and Londregan (1996), Persson and
Tabellini (2000), Stokes (2005), and other models of dis-
tributive politics, the theory assumes that voters have ide-
ological preferences as well as a preference for receiving
distributive benefits. Second, the act of turnout is costly
for voters (e.g., Aldrich 1993). Hence, a voter turns out
only if her preference for her favored candidate is suffi-
ciently strong.
Consequently, the delivery of hurricane aid to the
voter prior to the election can affect voter behavior in
one of three ways. If the voter has a strong ideological
preference for the incumbent, then delivering aid prior to
the election may further motivate the voter to turn out
in order to secure the incumbent’s reelection. If the voter
has a strong ideological preference for the challenger, then
pre-election aid from the incumbentmay induce the voter
to stay home by mitigating the voter’s hostility toward
the incumbent. And finally, if the voter is ideologically
indifferent between the two candidates, then the delivery
of aid might sway the voter’s preference.
The Asymmetric Partisan Effects of Disaster
Aid on Turnout
Regardless of voter ideology, the delivery of pre-election
disaster aid is an informative signal that enhances the
voter’s belief that the incumbent will again deliver aid in
the future. Hence, this enhanced belief always increases
the voter’s expected utility from having the incumbent
reelected.
Whether this enhanced belief increases or decreases
turnout depends on the voter’s ideological preference
over the two candidates. If the voter is right-wing and
already prefers the incumbent on ideological grounds,
then this enhanced belief induced by disaster aid simply
provides yet an additional motivation to turn out and
reelect the incumbent, thus increasing the probability of
turnout.
But disaster aid would have the opposite effect on
turnout for a left-wing voter. If she turns out, the left-
wing voter always prefers the left-wing challenger candi-
date on ideological grounds. Hence, the left-wing voter’s
probability of turnout depends on how strongly she
prefers the challenger over the incumbent. The deliv-
ery of pre-election disaster aid to the left-wing voter
enhances the voter’s perception of the incumbent, thus
mitigating the voter’s motivation to oust the incumbent.
This decreased motivation to vote the incumbent out
of office decreases the left-wing aid recipient’s proba-
bility of turnout. This theory thus makes the following
prediction:
Hypothesis 1: The delivery of disaster aid prior to the elec-
tion causes an increase in turnout for an incumbent-
supporting recipient but a decrease in turnout for a
challenger-supporting recipient.
This hypothesis is stated formally as Proposition 1 in
the formal model in the online appendix.
The Effects of Disaster Aid on the
Incumbent’s Vote Share
In Hypothesis 1, the delivery of aid increases incumbent
supporters’ turnout while decreasing opposition turnout.
Furthermore, as noted above, conditional on turning out,
the partisan left-wing and right-wing voters support the
challenger and the incumbent in the election, respec-
tively. Hence, disaster aid causes either an increase in the
incumbent’s vote totals or a decrease in the challenger’s
vote totals, depending on whether the voter is left- or
right-wing. In either case, the net effect on the incum-
bent’s vote share is therefore always a positive one, a result
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consistent with previous empirical findings in the dis-
aster relief literature (e.g., Reeves 2011). Hypothesis 2
summarizes this testable prediction:
Hypothesis 2: The delivery of disaster aid prior to the elec-
tion causes an increase in the incumbent candidate’s
electoral vote share.
The following section describes the context of the
FEMA disaster aid data, and these data are used to test
the two predictions of the theory. This article focuses
primarily on testing Hypothesis 1, while Hypothesis 2 is
tested in the Alternative Causal Explanations section.
The Distribution of FEMADisaster
Aid
This section describes three important characteristics of
FEMA disaster aid.
Presidential Disaster Declarations
First, residents of all 67 counties in Florida were eligi-
ble to apply for FEMA aid. In the 12 weeks prior to
the November 2004 presidential election, Florida was
struck by four hurricanes of at least Category II strength.
Hurricanes Charley (Category IV), Frances (Category II),
Ivan (Category III), and Jeanne (Category III)made land-
fall throughout Florida, prompting President Bush to is-
sue disaster declarations, with eligibility for individual
disaster aid, for all 67 of Florida’s counties during the
2004 hurricane season.
Hence, consistent with previous literature on presi-
dents’ disaster responses, the distribution of FEMA aid
does not manifest from any strategic county-level target-
ing of presidential disaster declarations within Florida.
Reeves (2011) finds that the president is more likely
to issue disaster declarations in states that are elec-
torally competitive, while Garrett and Sobel (2002) and
Downton and Pielke (2001) observe a spike in decla-
rations during election years. Both of these conditions
apply to this study: the FEMA aid analyzed in this arti-
cle was delivered just prior to the November 2004 elec-
tion, and Florida was a competitive swing state in both
the 2000 and 2004 presidential contests. The fact that
all 67 Florida counties were declared eligible for individ-
ual aid is therefore consistent with past studies’ findings
on the targeting of disaster declarations across different
states.
The Universal Nature of FEMA Aid
Second, FEMAdistributed hurricane disaster aid through
a universal, non-means-tested program. After President
Bush’s disaster declarations, Florida residents were el-
igible to apply for aid under FEMA’s Individuals and
Households Program (IHP). Officially, IHP, authorized
by the Stafford Act of 1988 (P.L. 93–288) and the Disas-
ter Mitigation Act of 2000 (P.L. 106–390), provides up to
$25,000 of assistance to victimized households to pay for
“necessary expenses and serious needs” not covered by
insurance (44 C.F.R. § 206.110a). FEMA most frequently
awards IHP aid to households to fund temporary hous-
ing, to repair damaged residences, to replace damaged
property, such as furniture and electronics, and to pay for
medical, funeral, and other personal expenses caused by
the hurricanes.
Disaster aid under IHP cannot be awarded or re-
stricted on the basis of residents’ income, a statutoryman-
date codified in 42 USC § 5163 and 42 USC § 5174(b)(1)
and implemented in 44 C.F.R. § 206.113. Instead, the pri-
mary restrictions are that IHP aid only covers inspector-
verified damage at an applicant’s primary residence,
FEMA awards may not duplicate insurance payouts, and
households may not receive more than $25,000 in to-
tal aid. In particular, the prohibition against duplicating
insurance payouts had the effect of disqualifying many
wealthier homeowners from receiving some categories of
FEMA aid. Nevertheless, many households with flood in-
surance still qualified for FEMA aid to cover uninsured
possessions and expenses.
The universal nature of FEMA disaster aid is an
important distinction, given the previous literature on
turnout. Scholars of political participation have found
that social spending programs mobilize voter turnout
only when benefits are distributed under universal,
non-means-tested programs (e.g., Mettler 2005; Verba,
Schlozman, and Brady 1995). For example, Mettler and
Stonecash (2008) find that the beneficiaries of universal
programs such as Veterans Benefits and Medicare vote
at higher rates than nonbeneficiaries. By contrast, Soss
(1999, 2002) and Bruch, Ferree, and Soss (2009) find that
means-tested welfare programs stigmatize voters, thus
possibly discouraging them from political participation.
Hence, this existing literature suggests that FEMA
disaster aid, which is universally available to hurricane
victims regardless of their income status, might mobi-
lize recipients to vote in order to protect potential aid in
the future. Although voters cannot directly control the
amount of aid delivered in the future, they can at least
mobilize to reelect a politician with a past history of sup-
porting disaster relief policies. This article contributes to
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the past literature by explaining why this mobilization
logic is conditional on recipients’ ideological proximity
to the incumbent government: the delivery of benefits
by a Republican administration to Republican recipients
should indeed mobilize their turnout. But the delivery of
benefits by a Republican administration to Democratic
recipients may induce a decrease in their turnout, as the
recipients’ stake inprotecting their benefits decreases their
motivation to oust the Republican incumbent.
The FEMAAid Decision Process
Residents self-select into applying for IHP aid simply by
providing their names and contact information to FEMA
in person, by telephone, or through FEMA’s website. Al-
though applicants may describe the hurricane damage to
their property, they are not permitted to request a spe-
cific aid amount. Nor does an applicant’s description of
damage either limit or enhance the amount of aid his or
her household is eligible to receive.
Instead, a FEMA inspector visits each applicant’s res-
idence to complete a checklist of damaged property and
to estimate the severity of any such damages. By protocol,
FEMA personnel check for a standard list of damaged ar-
eas in each home, regardless of whether the applicant had
reported damages in such areas. Specifically, the FEMA
inspector assigns a score of “X,” “Y,” or “Z” to each room
and each area of the residence, indicating the severity of
the hurricane damage. For each particular type of room
(e.g., kitchen, living room) and for a particular level of
damage (“X,” “Y,”or “Z”), FEMAawards apredetermined
amount of assistance, regardless of the actual value of the
applicant’s pre-hurricane property. Hence, the applicant
has no formal opportunities to strategically manipulate
the FEMA aid process by exaggerating the severity of hur-
ricane damage.
In the aftermath of the 2004 Florida hurricanes,
FEMA received applications for IHP aid from 1.1 mil-
lion unique households. FEMA approved aid awards for
about 40% of these applications, distributing over $1.2
billion in total assistance. The size of these awards varied
widely, ranging from under $100 to $25,000, depending
upon the FEMA inspectors’ assessments of damages. Fig-
ure App.1 of the online appendix details the distribution
of these awards.
By requiring inspectors to check for residential dam-
age, FEMA’s inspection procedures effectively distributed
IHP disaster aid most heavily to areas that experienced
the most severe hurricane storms. This geographic pat-
tern is illustrated in Figure App.2 of the online appendix,
which depicts the maximum wind speeds observed dur-
ing Hurricane Charley, the first declared disaster of the
2004 Atlantic hurricane season (FEMA Disaster #1539).
The bright pink areas in this map represent the highest
measuredwinds of over 130miles per hour, reflecting that
Hurricane Charley entered Florida’s Gulf coast through
Cape Coral, traveled northeast across the state, and exited
Florida’s Atlantic coast just south of Daytona Beach. The
green dots on the map identify the geocoded locations of
all Florida residents who applied for and successfully re-
ceived some disaster aid under FEMADisaster #1539. Al-
though aid recipients appear throughout the entire state,
this map illustrates that the vast majority of the recipi-
ents were geographically concentrated along the center of
Hurricane Charley’s path as the storm crossed Florida.
The Effect of FEMAAid on Individual
Voter Turnout
This section analyzes the effect of FEMA disaster aid
awards on individual voter turnout in November 2004. I
tracked the turnout of FEMA aid applicants by matching
the residential addresses listed on individual households’
FEMA applications with the addresses listed on Florida
voter registration and turnout records. In the aftermath
of the 2004 hurricane season, several Florida newspapers
made repeated requests under the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act (FOIA) to access records on individual FEMA
aid applicants. FEMA officials initially refused all of these
FOIA requests. However, several federal lawsuits, culmi-
nating in the 11th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals’ June 22,
2007, decision inNews-Press v. U.S. Department of Home-
land Security (No. 05–16771 and No. 06–13306), forced
FEMA to turn over detailed records on the Florida FEMA
aid applicants. These records contain the addresses of the
1.1 million households that applied for aid and the dol-
lar amounts awarded to the 40% of applicants who were
approved for aid.
Using these data, I matched the FEMA applicant ad-
dresses to Florida voter registration forms, on which vot-
ersmust self-report their residential addresses. I thenused
these records to identify all registered voterswhose house-
hold applied for FEMA aid in 2004. Finally, using voter
history files provided by counties’ boards of elections, I
tracked each registered voter’s turnout in the November
2002 (pre-hurricane) and 2004 (post-hurricane) general
elections.
This section’s empirical analyses include only Florida
residents who satisfied all four of the following criteria:
(1) the individual lives in a household that applied for
FEMA aid during the 2004 hurricane season; (2) FEMA
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took action on the household’s aid application prior to
the November 2004 general election; (3) the individual
was eligible and actively registered to vote in both the
2002 and 2004 general elections; and (4) the individual
was either a registered Democrat or Republican as of the
November 2004 election. There were 268,752 registered
voters who satisfied all four of these criteria, and these
voters collectively exhibited a 75% turnout rate in the
November 2004 Bush-Kerry presidential election.
Registered voters are not required to affiliate with
a party, but most do so because Florida operates closed
presidential primaries. TableApp.1of theonline appendix
details the breakdown of FEMA applicants by party affili-
ation, showing that 83% of registered voters who applied
for aid are affiliated with either theDemocratic or Repub-
lican parties. Additionally, the histograms in Figure App.1
illustrate the distribution of FEMA award sizes across the
Democratic and Republican registrants in the data. These
histograms show that FEMA applicants from the two par-
ties received a comparable range of award sizes. Themean
award size for approved applicants in these data was $682.
Equation (1) is a test of Hypothesis 1, which pre-
dicts that with a right-wing incumbent, distributive aid
should increase right-wing voter turnout while decreas-
ing left-wing turnout. Specifically, equation (1) regresses
an applicant’s November 2004 turnout onto the appli-
cant’s turnout in November 2002 and whether the appli-
cant was approved for FEMA disaster aid. The basic logit
model is:




 + A · Application Appr ovedi
+ RA · (Republicani
×Application Approvedi)
+ R · Republicani
+ 02 · (Voted 2002i ) + εi ,
(1)
where Application Approvedi indicates whether the ap-
plicant was awarded aid. Voted 2002i and Voted 2004i
indicate whether applicant i voted in the 2002 and 2004
elections, respectively, and Republicani is an indicator
for registered Republicans; all other voters are registered
Democrats.
Effect of FEMA Aid on Turnout Probability
In Table 1, Model 3 estimates equation (1) using the full
set of Democratic and Republican voters, and Models 1
and 2 estimate equation (1) by examiningDemocrats and
Republican voters separately. The online appendix (Table
App.2) also reestimates the full equation (1)models using
standard errors clustered at the county level.
Overall, the Table 1 results corroborate the Hypoth-
esis 1 predictions. I use CLARIFY (King, Tomz, and
Wittenberg 2000) to interpret the following Table 1 re-
sults. In Model 3, the awarding of FEMA aid to a Repub-
lican applicant who did not vote in 2002 increases her
probability of turnout in November 2004 by 2.1 percent-
age points, from 50.8% to 52.9%. The simulated 95%
confidence interval for this estimated turnout effect is
[+1.3%, +2.9%]. But for a similar Democratic appli-
cant, FEMA aid causes a 0.9 percentage point decrease
in turnout probability, from 47.8% to 46.9%. The 95%
confidence interval for this estimated turnout effect is
[−0.2%, −1.6%].
Control Variables
In Table 1, Models 4 to 6 control for several hurricane-
related anddemographic variables. I geocode the voters in
thedatausing thehomeaddresses listedon their voter reg-
istrations. Using NOAA satellite data with discrete wind
vectors recorded during each major hurricane, I inter-
polated the hurricane winds experienced at each voter’s
residential location. The Table 1 models control for the
Maximum Wind Speed, measured in miles per hour, at
each voter’s residence during the 2004 hurricane season.
Other controls include theVoter’s Gender, theVoter’s Age,
African American Voters, theMedianHousehold Income of
the census block group in which the voter resides, and the
Median Home Value in the block group. These expanded
models also include County Fixed Effects. The estimated
turnout effects of FEMA aid remain comparable in direc-
tion and significance in these expanded models.
Effect of FEMA Aid Delivered OneWeek
before the Election
Intuitively, the effect of aid awarded just prior to the elec-
tion should be especially large. To test this intuition, I
divide all FEMA awards into two groups: (1) awards de-
livered during the week prior to the election, October
27 to November 2 (5% of all awards); and (2) awards
delivered at all earlier times (95% of all awards).
I then estimate the effects of awards delivered just
prior to the election. In the online appendix, Table App.3
presents the full model specifications and coefficient esti-
mates, and the estimated turnout effects are summarized
as follows. FEMA awards delivered one week prior to
the election cause a +5.1% increase in the probability of
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TABLE 1 Effect of FEMA Application Approval on Voter Turnout among FEMAApplicants
Dependent Variable: Voted in November 2004 Election
Model (3): Model (6):
Model (1): Model (2): Democrats and Model (4): Model (5): Democrats and
Voters Included: Democrats Republicans Republicans Democrats Republicans Republicans
FEMA Application Approved −0.036∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗ −0.035∗∗ −0.039∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗ −0.041∗∗
(0.013) (0.016) (0.013) (0.014) (0.016) (0.014)
FEMA Application Approved × – – 0.118∗∗∗ – – 0.100∗∗∗
Registered Republican (0.020) (0.021)
Registered Republican – – 0.141∗∗∗ – – 0.080∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.016)
Voted in November 2002 2.358∗∗∗ 2.416∗∗∗ 2.384∗∗∗ 2.343∗∗∗ 2.347∗∗∗ 2.352∗∗∗
General Election (0.014) (0.016) (0.011) (0.015) (0.017) (0.011)
MaximumWind Speed – – – 0.000 −0.011∗ −0.005
(Miles Per Hour) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003)
MaximumWind Speed – – – 0.000 0.000∗ 0.000
(Miles Per Hour Squared) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Voter’s Age (Years) – – – 0.071∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Voter’s Age (Years Squared) – – – −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Med. Home Value in Block – – – 0.009∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗
Group ($1,000s) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Voter’s Gender (Male) – – – −0.276∗∗∗ −0.162∗∗∗ −0.226∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.016) (0.010)
African American – – – −0.011 −0.474∗∗∗ −0.027
(0.018) (0.051) (0.016)
Med. Household Income in – – – 0.081∗∗∗ 0.092∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗
Block Group ($1,000s) (0.008) (0.009) (0.006)
County Fixed Effects – – – Included Included Included
Constant −0.088∗∗∗ 0.032∗ −0.097∗∗∗ −1.689∗∗∗ −1.534∗∗∗ −1.633∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.013) (0.010) (0.182) (0.229) (0.140)
Pseudo R2 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.34 0.33 0.34
N 142,637 126,115 268,752 142,637 126,115 268,752
∗∗∗p< .001; ∗∗p< .01; ∗p< .05 (two-tailed). Standard errors in parentheses.
Note: Data include registered voters whose household applied for FEMA disaster aid before the November 2004 election and who were
registered to vote in both the 2002 and 2004 elections.
turnout for a Republican who previously did not vote;
the confidence interval for this effect is [+2.9%,+7.4%].
For a similarly situated Democrat, the effect of receiving
FEMA aid one week before the election is a 3.1% decrease
in the probability of turnout, with a confidence inter-
val of [−1.2%, −5.0%]. Hence, FEMA aid delivered one
week before the election has an abnormally large effect
on Republican and Democratic turnout. Later placebo
tests show that post-election FEMA aid has no signifi-
cant effect on turnout, providing further support for the
hypothesized causal direction.
Effect of FEMA Award Sizes
FEMA awards vary widely in size, and although this ar-
ticle’s theory does not incorporate this complexity, larger
award sizes should intuitively cause larger positive and
negative turnout effects for Republicans and Democrats,
respectively. Most awardees received under $2,000, but
awards ranged up to $25,000. Because of this significant
right tail, Table App.4 of the online appendix reestimates
all of theTable 1models by replacingApplicationApproved
with Logged FEMA Aid Size. To include the significant
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fraction of applicants whowere rejected and thus received
$0, I add$1 to every award size before logging.TableApp.5
presents similarmodels using alternative specifications of
the Logged FEMA Aid term.
The results in Table App.4 confirm that larger award
sizes indeed produce turnout effects of significantly
greater magnitude. For Democrats (Model 1), receiving
an average-sized award of $682 causes a 1.5% decrease in
turnout probability for a previous nonvoter. By contrast,
Model 2 estimates that for Republicans, the same award
size causes a 1.3% increase in turnout probability.
How substantively large are these turnout effects of
FEMA aid? In the most extreme case, the earlier results
estimated that FEMA awards delivered one week prior to
the election cause a 5.1% increase in the probability of
Republican turnout. This estimate implies that $13,373
of FEMA aid produces one new Republican voter, an
estimate that is nearly identical to Levitt and Snyder’s
(1997) calculation that $14,000 of federal spending gen-
erates one additional vote for an incumbent legislator.
But for FEMA aid delivered temporally further away
from the election, the turnout effect is much smaller:
$32,476 of aid increases Republican turnout by one voter.
Hence, although delivering FEMA aid produces statisti-
cally significant effects on Republican and Democratic
turnout, disaster aid is likely not the most impactful
type of federal spending when compared to the many
types of federal spending in the Levitt and Snyder (1997)
data.
Robustness of Empirical Findings
Having illustrated the main statistical relationship be-
tween FEMA aid delivery and voter turnout, this article
proceeds to evaluate the causal direction and the empiri-
cal robustness of this main finding. To do so, this section
explores several placebo tests, potential omitted variables,
and selection issues that arise in the FEMA aid data.
Collectively, these additional empirical tests strengthen
this article’s main empirical argument that FEMA aid
increased turnout among incumbent supporters and de-
creased turnout among opposition voters.
Causal Identification and Placebo Tests
What is the causal direction of the empirical relationship
between FEMA aid and increased turnout in November
2004? Two potential alternative explanations for themain
findings inTable 1 are reverse causality,whereby increased
turnout from 2002 to 2004 causes FEMA aid receipt, or
an omitted variable that simultaneously causes FEMA aid
receipt and increased turnout from 2002 to 2004.
To test for these alternative causal explanations, this
section presents several placebo tests that take advan-
tage of the temporal distribution of FEMA aid applica-
tions. FEMAcontinued to accept aid applications through
December 2004, and although the majority of hurricane
victims applied for aid before November, 40,656 regis-
tered Democrats and Republicans in the data did not
apply until after the November general election.
The placebo test therefore examines whether FEMA
aid that was awarded after the November election affects
Election Day turnout. Election turnout and post-election
FEMA aid should be correlated only if reverse causality or
anomitted variable is driving themainTable 1 results. The
placebo tests reestimate the equation (1)model usingonly
the 40,656 registered voters who applied for aid during
2004 but after the November election.
The placebo test results appear in Table 2. The six
logit models estimated in Table 3 are identical to the six
models reported in Table 1, except that the data include
only post-election applicants. Each of the six placebo tests
in Table 2 finds no statistically significant effect of post-
election FEMA aid on Election Day turnout. In contrast
to the Table 1 results, Republicans who would later re-
ceive FEMA aid after the election did not exhibit higher
turnout than nonrecipients. Nor was there a significant
turnout effect for Democrats who would subsequently
receive FEMA aid. The magnitudes of the Application
Approvedi coefficients estimated in the placebo tests are
also much smaller than in the Table 1 results and statisti-
cally indistinguishable from zero. Thus, the placebo tests
fail to find evidence of reverse causality in the main tests
of equation (1).
Effect of Previous Turnout on Program
Participation
A possible selection issue in the main results is that indi-
viduals may self-select into applying for FEMA aid based
on factors that are also related to their turnout. Such self-
selection is plausible, given that civic skills, as described
byVerba, Schlozman, andBrady (1995),may explain both
turnout and applying for aid. If such self-selection occurs,
then the population that applied for aid is not perfectly
comparable to those who did not apply for aid, thus
potentially limiting the external validity of this article’s
findings.
To test for and correct such self-selection bias,
Table 3 employs a Heckman selection model. The
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TABLE 2 Placebo Test of ResidentsWho Applied for FEMA Aid after November 2004
Dependent Variable: Voted in November 2004 Election
Model (3): Model (6):
Model (1): Model (2): Democrats and Model (4): Model (5): Democrats and
Voters Included: Democrats Republicans Republicans Democrats Republicans Republicans
FEMA Application Approved −0.011 −0.006 −0.011 0.017 −0.012 0.016
(Post-November 2004) (0.034) (0.040) (0.034) (0.036) (0.041) (0.035)
FEMA Application Approved – – 0.005 – – −0.020
(Post-November 2004) ×
Registered Republican (0.053) (0.054)
Registered Republican – – 0.179∗∗∗ – – 0.139∗∗
(0.040) (0.043)
Voted in November 2002 2.301∗∗∗ 2.315∗∗∗ 2.307∗∗∗ 2.291∗∗∗ 2.234∗∗∗ 2.269∗∗∗
General Election (0.036) (0.041) (0.027) (0.039) (0.044) (0.029)
MaximumWind Speed – – – 0.003 −0.006 −0.000
(Miles Per Hour) (0.014) (0.016) (0.010)
MaximumWind Speed – – – −0.000 0.000 −0.000
(Miles Per Hour Squared) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Voter’s Age (Years) – – – 0.071∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.007) (0.004)
Voter’s Age (Years Squared) – – – −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Med. Home Value in – – – 0.008 0.005 0.006
Block Group ($1,000s) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004)
Voter’s Gender (Male) – – – −0.260∗∗∗ −0.146∗∗∗ −0.207∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.040) (0.027)
African American – – – −0.034 −0.397∗∗∗ −0.066
(0.044) (0.117) (0.040)
Med. Household Income in – – – 0.091∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗
Block Group ($1,000s) (0.019) (0.021) (0.014)
County Fixed Effects – – – Included Included Included
Constant −0.077∗∗ 0.097∗∗ −0.079∗∗ −1.671∗∗ −1.328∗ −1.558∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.034) (0.027) (0.515) (0.607) (0.388)
Pseudo R2 0.29 0.28 0.29 0.33 0.32 0.32
N 21,864 18,792 40,656 21,864 18,792 40,656
∗∗∗p< .001; ∗∗p< .01; ∗p< .05 (two-tailed). Standard errors in parentheses.
Note: Data include registered voters whose household applied for FEMA disaster aid after the November 2004 election and who were
registered to vote in both the 2002 and 2004 elections.
selection model compares individuals who selected into
applying for FEMA aid against those who were eligible
but chose not to apply. To estimate this selection model,
I use Florida voter registration lists to identify all Florida
residents who (1) were registered and eligible to vote in
bothNovember 2002 and 2004, and (2) were registered as
either a Democrat or Republican. These two criteria pro-
duce a full set of 3,571,284 individuals, representing the
universe of previously registered voters who were eligible
to apply for FEMA aid in Florida. As previously noted,
only 268,752 (7.5%) of these individuals actually applied
for aid prior to the November election.
The Heckman selection model results appear as fol-
lows. The right column of Table 3 presents the selec-
tion model, which estimates self-selection into applying
for FEMA aid among the full set of 3.57 million eligi-
ble residents. The middle column of Table 3 presents the
Heckman probit outcomemodel, which predicts Novem-
ber 2004 turnout for the 268,752 residents who applied
for FEMA aid. This outcomemodel is identical in setup to
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TABLE 3 Heckman Censored Probit Model
Voters Included:Democrats and Republicans
Standard Probit Heckman Outcome Heckman Selection
Model: Voted in Model: Voted in Model: Applied for
Dependent Variable: November 2004 November 2004 FEMA Aid
FEMA Application Approved −0.020∗ −0.019∗ –
(0.008) (0.008)
FEMA Application Approved × 0.068∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗ –
Registered Republican (0.012) (0.012)
Registered Republican 0.082∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.002)
Voted in November 2002 1.379∗∗∗ 1.378∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗
General Election (0.006) (0.006) (0.002)
Median Household Income of – – 0.028∗
Block Group ($100,000s) (0.009)
Median Home Value in – – −0.230∗∗∗
Block Group ($100,000s) (0.003)
Male Gender – – −0.008∗∗∗
(0.002)
African American – – 0.073∗∗∗
(0.003)
MaximumWind Speed (Miles – – 0.034∗∗∗
Per Hour) (0.000)
MaximumWind Speed (Miles – – −0.000∗∗∗
Per Hour Squared) (0.000)
Voter’s Age (Years) – – 0.020∗∗∗
(0.000)
Voter’s Age (Years Squared) – – −0.000∗∗∗
(0.000)




N 268,752 268,752 3,571,284
∗∗∗p< .001; ∗∗p< .01; ∗p< .05 (two-tailed). Standard errors in parentheses.
Note: The full data include all Democrats and Republicans who were registered to vote in both the 2002 and 2004 elections. The selection
model predicts which of these registrants self-select into applying for FEMA aid prior to the November 2004 election.
equation (1), except that the parameters of the Heckman
outcome model and the selection model are jointly esti-
mated via maximum likelihood. Finally, for comparison
purposes, the left column of Table 3 presents a standard
uncorrected probit model estimating equation (1).
TheHeckmanmodel inTable 3 reveals three findings.
First, the selection model in the right column finds that
previous 2002 voters are indeed more likely to apply for
FEMA aid than nonvoters, even after accounting for hur-
ricane wind speeds and various demographics. Second,
this self-selection indeed affects the corrected outcome
model, and the model results reject the null hypothesis
that the outcome equation and selection equation are in-
dependent. But third, the estimated effects of FEMA aid
on turnout in the corrected Heckman outcome model
remain statistically significant and in the same direc-
tions as in the main results. Substantively, the estimated
turnout effects are only slightly smaller in magnitude
than in the standard uncorrected probit model in the
left column of Table 3. Hence, the Heckman estimates
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TABLE 4 Effect of FEMA Application Approval on Voter Turnout among Previous Voters and
Previous Nonvoters
Dependent Variable: Voted in November 2004 Election
November 2002 Voters November 2002 Nonvoters
whose Party Affiliation is . . . whose Party Affiliation is . . .
Democrat or Democrat or
Democrat Republican Republican Democrat Republican Republican
Voters Included: Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6)
FEMA Application Approved −0.017 0.101∗∗∗ −0.017 −0.044∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗ −0.044∗∗
(0.024) (0.026) (0.024) (0.016) (0.019) (0.016)
FEMA Application Approved × – – 0.118∗∗∗ – – 0.118∗∗∗
Registered Republican (0.036) (0.025)
Registered Republican – – 0.179∗∗∗ – – 0.122∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.018)
Constant 2.260∗∗∗ 2.439∗∗∗ 2.260∗∗∗ −0.084∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗ −0.084∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.019) (0.017) (0.012) (0.014) (0.012)
Pseudo R2 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30
N 81,148 82,427 163,575 61,489 43,688 105,177
Total Applicants 81,148 82,427 163,575 61,489 43,688 105,177
Applicants Awarded Aid 39,583 44,104 83,687 32,006 23,723 55,729
Approval Rate 48.8% 53.5% 51.2% 52.1% 54.3% 54.0%
∗∗∗p< .001; ∗∗p< .01. Standard errors in parentheses.
Note: Data include registered voters whose household applied for FEMA disaster aid before the November 2004 election and who were
registered to vote in both the 2002 and 2004 elections.
reveal that self-selection indeed affects the composition
of applicants in the data, but after correcting for selec-
tion bias, the main results regarding increased Repub-
lican turnout and decreased Democratic turnout still
hold.
Effect of Previous Turnout on FEMA
Application Approval
A related issue is that turnout in the previous election
is related to the approval of one’s FEMA application.
Since Key (1949), political scientists have suggested that
voters who exhibit higher turnout rates may receive fa-
vorable treatment from the government. For example,
Aldrich and Crook (2008) find that undesirable FEMA
trailer parks are targeted toward neighborhoods with
lower voter turnout. If FEMA treats previous voters and
nonvoters differently, then approved FEMA applicants
may be dissimilar in political activeness to rejected ap-
plicants in the data, thus raising the possibility that this
article’s main findings may not generalize to all types of
voters.
To explore this possibility, the bottom portion of
Table 4 compares FEMA approval rates for November
2002 voters and nonvoters. Previous nonvoters had their
applications approved at a slightly higher rate than previ-
ous voters. The likely explanation for this finding is that
previous voters applied for FEMA aid more aggressively,
even after controlling for wind speeds, as illustrated by
the estimated Heckman selection model in Table 3. Con-
sequently, these previous voters were more likely to be
rejected, as these aggressive applications were less likely
to have been justified by hurricane conditions.
To account for this issue, the upper portion of Table 4
analyzes the main equation (1) model separately for pre-
vious voters and nonvoters, as these two groups repre-
sent different self-selected samples of voters. Although
the findings are consistent with the main empirical re-
sults of this article, Table 4 also isolates the source of the
empirical results, demonstrating that FEMAaidprimarily
affects the turnout behavior of previous nonvoters, rather
than previous voters. For Republicans, receiving FEMA
aid causes an estimated 1.8% increase in the November
2004 turnout of previous nonvoters (Model 5), but only a
0.7% increase in the turnout of previous voters (Model 2).
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FIGURE 1 Turnout Rate among FEMAAid Recipients and Rejected Applicants
Note:Data include registered voters whose household applied for FEMAdisaster aid before theNovember 2004 election, whowere registered
to vote in both the 2002 and 2004 elections, and who were either registered Democrats (left plot) or Republicans (right plot) as of the
November 2004 election.
Analogously, for Democrats, receiving FEMA aid causes
an estimated 1.1% decrease in the turnout of previous
nonvoters (Model 4), but only a statistically insignificant
decrease in the turnout of previous voters (Model 1).
Hence, previous turnout indeed affects the magnitude,
though not the direction, of voters’ November 2004 re-
sponses to FEMA aid: overall, previous nonvoters exhibit
larger turnout effects from receiving FEMA aid.
Partisan Differences in Hurricane
Victimization
Did Democratic and Republican applicants in the data
experience significantly different levels of hurricane vic-
timization during the 2004 season? The data demonstrate
that Republican voters in Florida were slightlymore likely
to be victimized by hurricanes than Democrats. Figure
App.3 of the online appendix details this pattern by plot-
ting the distribution of maximum wind speeds experi-
enced by the individual voters of each party. This figure
reveals that at the areaswith the strongest hurricanewinds
of over 65 miles per hour, victims were more likely to be
Republicans than Democrats.
To address this confounding factor, I examine
whether the main findings hold when comparing Demo-
cratic and Republican applicants who experienced iden-
tical hurricane severity. To make such comparisons,
Figure 1 sorts FEMA applicants into six groups, based
on the hurricane wind severity observed at the appli-
cants’ respective residences. The left plot displays Demo-
cratic FEMAapplicantswhoabstained inNovember2002,
while the right plot contains Republican applicants who
abstained in 2002. Within each plot and within each of
the six groups, Figure 1 compares the November 2004
turnout rate of FEMA aid awardees against the turnout
rate of rejected applicants. This difference in turnout rate
thus reflects the effect of FEMA aid on turnout within
each group.
Figure 1 reveals that themain turnout findings forRe-
publicans andDemocrats holdwithin eachof the six levels
of hurricane severity. Within each level, Democrats re-
ceiving aid exhibited lower turnout rates than Democrats
who were denied aid. And within each group, Republican
awardees exhibited higher turnout rates than rejected Re-
publican applicants. Hence, the main results hold when
comparing Republicans andDemocrats with similar hur-
ricane victimization.
Partisan Bias in the Awarding of FEMA Aid
In addition to differences in hurricane victimization,
Democrat and Republican aid applicants may have
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received disparate treatment by FEMA. If partisan bias
occurred, then such biased treatment by FEMA could
possibly elicit either positive or negative reactions by vot-
ers, thus affecting their turnout.
Indeed, Table 4 suggests the possibility of such
partisan bias by illustrating that Republican applicants
(53.7%) were awarded aid at a slightly higher rate than
Democratic applicants (50.2%). But the higher approval
rate for Republicans also reflects the fact that Republicans
were victimized by hurricanes more severely. To examine
more carefully whether FEMA exhibited bias, Figure 2
considers how FEMA treated applicants of each party af-
ter controlling for two important predictors of disaster
aid eligibility: (1) the hurricane severity at the applicant’s
home and (2) the applicant’s income. Higher-income in-
dividuals are more likely to carry flood insurance, thus
disqualifying them from receiving FEMA aid for damages
to insured property.
To control for these two factors, Figure 2 compares
the average FEMA aid awarded to Republican andDemo-
cratic applicants within each of three income categories
and within each of six categories of hurricane wind sever-
ity. In Figure 2, average Republican aid awards are de-
picted in red triangles, while Democrats are in blue cir-
cles.Overall, this figure illustrates thatwithin each income
group and at each level of hurricane severity, Democratic
and Republican applicants are treated similarly by FEMA,
with no systematic pattern of Republican favoritism. In
fact, themost notable partisan disparity occurs within the
lowest income group, where Democrats receive slightly
larger aid awards, though the magnitude of these differ-
ences is relatively small. In sum, after considering appli-
cants’ hurricane severity and household income, there
is no strong evidence that FEMA engaged in individual-
level targeting of Republican applicants in its distribution
of aid. As a further illustration of this lack of Republican
targeting, Figure App.4 of the online appendix presents
additional plots that sort applicants by their estimated
home values, illustrating FEMA’s similar treatment of
Democratic and Republican applicants within each level
of home values.
Partisan Differences in Efficacy of FEMA
Experiences
A related issue is that even if FEMA awarded aid eq-
uitably to Democrats and Republicans, Democratic ap-
plicants could still have been treated less efficiently by
FEMA’s inspectors. This potential concern is important
to explore because previous literature on social programs
has found that inefficacious program administration can
cause political discouragement among clients. For ex-
ample, Soss (1999) and Mettler and Stonecash (2008)
find that poor beneficiaries of some means-tested pro-
grams, including AFDC and food stamps, exhibit lower
political participation because of the stigmatizing, in-
efficacious, and unresponsive administration of such
programs.
To explore whether FEMA treated Democratic appli-
cants more inefficaciously than Republicans, I counted
the number of days that elapsed from the initial fil-
ing of each application until FEMA’s inspection and
final disposition of the application. While most appli-
cants waited no more than one week for an inspection,
some applicants in areas with especially severe hurri-
cane damage waited up to several weeks for FEMA to
respond.
Thedata reveal thatDemocratswere not treatedmore
slowly than Republicans. Figure App.5 of the online ap-
pendix illustrates this pattern in greater detail, showing
the average wait term endured by Democratic and Re-
publican applicants sorted by the hurricane wind severity
at their respective homes. In fact, for applicants living
in areas of moderate hurricane damage (45 to 85 mile-
per-hour winds), Republican applicants actually waited
slightly longer than Democrats for FEMA to respond,
though these differences are not large.
Next, having found that Democratic applications
were not processed less efficaciously, I examine whether
applicants’ waiting times affected their November 2004
turnout. Table App.6 of the online appendix reesti-
mates all of the main Table 1 models while controlling
for each applicant’s Waiting Time for FEMA Response.
The Waiting Time variable is never a significant predic-
tor of turnout, and its inclusion in these models does
not alter the main finding that FEMA aid decreases
turnout among Democrats and increases turnout among
Republicans.
Spatial Autocorrelation
Hurricane victimization occurs in a geographically clus-
tered fashion, and the damage from the 2004 hurri-
cane season and the ensuing disaster aid from FEMA
were distributed unevenly throughout Florida. Hence,
these geographic patterns raise the possibility that the
main turnout results in Table 1 may be largely driven
by voters in a small number of localized areas within
Florida. The following two robustness checks address this
possibility.
First, I test for spatial autocorrelation in the resid-
uals of the main Table 1 turnout models. Specifically, I
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FIGURE 2 The Awarding of FEMA Aid by Party, by Income Group, and by Hurricane Severity
Note:Data include all individuals whowere registered to vote in both the 2002 and 2004 elections, andwhowere either registeredDemocrats
(blue circles) or Republicans (red triangles) as of the November 2004 election.
calculate the residuals from Model 4 of Table 1, which
predicts FEMA aid’s effect on Democratic turnout. I
geocoded the residuals using each voter’s residential ad-
dress and display a map of these residuals in Figure App.6
of the online appendix, with colors ranging from orange
to blue representing the most negative to most positive
residuals, respectively. Figure App.6 also presents details
of a Global Moran’s Index test for spatial autocorrela-
tion. Similarly, Figure App.7 presents an analogous map
and Moran’s I calculations for the residuals of Model 5
of Table 1, which predicts FEMA aid’s effect on Republi-
can turnout. Together, these tests find no significant evi-
dence of spatial autocorrelation in the residuals for either
Democratic or Republican voters.
As a second test, Table App.2 of the online appendix
reestimates each of the full models from Table 1 using
standard errors clustered by county.While these clustered
standard errors are slightly larger than the nonclustered
results estimated in Table 1, the reestimated effects of
FEMA aid on turnout remain statistically significant and
in the same directions as before.
Republican Awardees’ Motivation for
Increased Turnout
A final test of this article’s theory concerns the motiva-
tion of Republican FEMA recipients for increasing their
turnout. This test considers the possibility that Republi-
can awardees increase their turnout not because FEMA
aid enhances their esteem for the incumbent president,
but instead, because of their dissatisfaction with the
FEMA aid process. If Republican awardees were generally
dissatisfied with their experiences with the FEMA admin-
istration, then one would expect precincts receivingmore
FEMA aid awards to exhibit more electoral opposition to
President Bush, even in Republican-leaning precincts.
Measuring the electoral effects of FEMA aid also
represents a direct test of Hypothesis 2, which predicts
that by causing increased Republican turnout and de-
creased Democratic turnout, FEMA aid should thereby
cause an increase in President Bush’sNovember 2004 vote
share. This hypothesis logically holds only if the Repub-
lican FEMA recipients who increased their turnout rate
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TABLE 5 WLS Regression: The Effect of FEMA Aid on Precinct-Level Bush Vote Share
Dependent Variable: 2004 George Bush Vote Share×100
Model (4): Model (5):
Model (1): Model (2): Model (3): Democratic Republican
All All All Precincts Precincts
Precincts Included: Precincts Precincts Precincts (< 50% Bush Vote) (> 50% Bush Vote)
Proposition 2: 0.36∗∗∗ 0.78∗∗∗ 1.03∗∗∗ 0.58∗∗∗ 1.25∗∗∗
FEMA Aid (Dollars Per Capita, Logged) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.06)
2000 G. W. Bush Vote Share 33.65∗∗∗ 26.16∗∗∗ 27.26∗∗∗ 17.49∗∗∗ 33.28∗∗∗
(1.02) (1.03) (0.93) (1.34) (1.65)
2002 Jeb Bush Vote Share 60.19∗∗∗ 66.50∗∗∗ 57.12∗∗∗ 61.58∗∗∗ 52.55∗∗∗
(1.03) (1.03) (1.07) (1.39) (1.69)
Median Household Income ($10,000s) – – 0.50∗∗∗ 0.66∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.06) (0.06)
Welfare Receipts ($1,000s) Per Capita – – −11.97∗∗∗ −7.80∗∗∗ −14.13∗∗∗
(2.06) (2.68) (3.16)
African American Proportion – – −4.88∗∗∗ −5.12∗∗∗ −7.09∗∗∗
(0.46) (0.60) (1.20)
Homeowner Proportion – – 5.50∗∗∗ 3.87∗∗∗ 6.88∗∗∗
(0.33) (0.41) (0.54)
Hurricane Wind Speeds Included No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.77∗∗∗ 6.28∗∗∗ 7.16∗∗∗ 7.64∗∗∗ 7.45∗∗∗
(0.23) (0.49) (0.62) (0.99) (1.03)
R2 0.93 0.93 0.94 0.93 0.80
N 5,897 5,897 5,897 2,866 3,031
∗∗∗p< .001. Standard errors in parentheses.
Note: Observations are weighted by precinct voting-age population. Democratic (Republican) precincts are those in which George Bush’s
share of the two-party vote in November 2000 was under (at least) 50%.
actually vote for President Bush. To test this prediction,
Table 5 estimates the precinct-level relationship between
FEMA aid and increased Bush vote share in November
2004, relative to November 2000. Hence, the data include
onlyprecincts thatwere geographically comparable across
the 2000, 2002, and 2004 elections and that have provided
presidential vote counts for all three elections.Of Florida’s
6,616 precincts, 5,897 (89%) satisfy these criteria and are
included.
To test Hypothesis 2, equation (2) regresses President
Bush’s 2004 precinct-level vote share onto the amount of
FEMA aid each precinct’s residents collectively received.
The model also controls for precinct-level vote shares in
the 2000 presidential election and the 2002 gubernato-
rial election, which the president’s brother, Republican
Jeb Bush, won by a margin of 56% to 43%. The full
model is:
Bush04i = + B00 · Bush00i + B02 · Bush02i
+F · FEMAAidi +  · xi + εi , (2)
where Bush04i, Bush00i, and Bush02i are George Bush’s
(November 2004 and November 2000) and Jeb Bush’s
(November 2002) vote shares, respectively, of the two-
party vote in precinct i. FEMA Aidi is measured as
log(Dollar si + 1), where Dollarsi is the number of
FEMA aid dollars per capita that residents of precinct
i received during 2004 prior to Election Day. Finally, xi
represents a vector of the following control variables: the
highest Hurricane Wind Speed measured in precinct i
during each of the four hurricanes, the precinct’s Me-
dian Household Income, the amount ofWelfare Per Capita
received by the precinct, the African American Propor-
tion, and the proportion of the precinct’s residents who
are Homeowners. Finally, the full model includes county
fixed effects. All observations are weighted by precinct-
level voting-age population.
Table 5 reports estimates of equation (2) using the
full model (Model 3), without the control variables
(Model 2), and without the Hurricane Wind Speed mea-
surements (Model 1). Models 4 and 5 also estimate
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equation (2) separately for Democratic-leaning (Model
1) and Republican-leaning (Model 2) precincts;
Democratic-leaning precincts are those which supported
Al Gore over George Bush in November 2000, and
Republican-leaning precincts are those with more Bush
voters. Collectively, the results in Table 5 corroborate the
theoretical predictionofHypothesis 2: inbothRepublican
andDemocratic areas, the increase in Republican turnout
and the decrease in Democratic turnout caused by FEMA
aid both appear to positively affect Bush’s vote share. In
Republican-leaning precincts (Model 5), a $100per capita
increase in FEMA aid causes a 1.0% increase in Bush’s
2004 vote share; this estimate has a 95% confidence inter-
val of+0.9% to+1.1%. In Democratic-leaning precincts
(Model 4), a $100 per capita increase in aid causes a 0.5%
increase in Bush’s 2004 vote share, with a confidence in-
terval of +0.4% to +0.6%.
The online appendix presents two further robustness
checks of these basic tests of Hypothesis 2. First, Table
App.7 reestimates all of the Table 5 models using clus-
tered standard errors; although the estimated clustered
standard errors are larger, the overall effects of FEMA aid
onBushvote share remain statistically significant. Second,
Figure App.8 presents plots of the precinct-level data to
graphically illustrate the relationship between FEMA aid
and Bush vote share. In each plot in this figure, the verti-
cal axis measures each precinct’s residual Bush vote share
whenGeorge Bush’s (2004) precinct-level vote share is re-
gressed onto its 2000 and 2002 Bush vote shares. In other
words, the residual vote share measures each precinct’s
unexpected support for President Bush in 2004, given the
precinct’s past pre-hurricane history of Republican vot-
ing. The horizontal axis in each plotmeasures the amount
of FEMA aid per capita received by the residents of each
precinct. The dashed line in each plot represents the
population-weighted least-squares fit within each plot,
illustrating the positive relationship between FEMA aid
and Bush vote share.
Discussion
This article makes three new contributions to the ex-
isting literature on distributive spending and political
participation. First, it illustrates that one important ef-
fect of government spending is the suppression of voter
participation among opposition party constituents while
simultaneously mobilizing core constituents. Past empir-
ical studies have argued that distributive spending af-
fects electoral outcomes by mobilizing core voter turnout
(e.g., Cox and Kouser 1981; Nicther 2007) or by persuad-
ing moderate or swing voters (e.g., Dixit and Londregan
1996, 1998; Stokes 2005).
This article contributes to this literature by empiri-
cally demonstrating that in addition to the core and swing
voter effects, distributive benefits may also enhance the
incumbent party’s electoral prospects by suppressing the
opposing party’s voter turnout. Previously, formal mod-
els by Heckelman (1998), Morgan and Vardy (2006), and
Gans-Morse,Mazzuca, andNichter (2009)have suggested
the possibility of “negative turnout buying” or “buying
abstention,” whereby a party explicitly bribes opposi-
tion voters to abstain from voting. Anecdotally, Cox and
Kousser (1981), Argersinger (1987), and Schaffer (2002)
described historical instances in which parties may have
engaged in “negative turnout buying” strategies. While
the electoral impacts of FEMA aid certainly do not qual-
ify as “negative turnout buying,” they nevertheless de-
scribe a related situation in which distributive benefits
persuade opposition voters to abstain from participating
in an election. This article is the first to provide sys-
tematic, individual-level evidence that a party’s delivery
of distributive benefits can indeed depress the electoral
turnout of the opposition party’s voters.
Second, this article’s theory explains, and the em-
pirical results illustrate, why a nonpartisan distributive
program can cause such partisan disparity in politi-
cal participation. In studies of developing democracies
and political machines, a discussion of swing voter (e.g.,
Dixit and Londregan 1996, 1998; Stokes 2005) and core
voter models (e.g., Cox and McCubbins 1986; Nichter
2007) can safely presume that a political party often has
the option of targeting distributive benefits to a chosen
constituency primarily on the basis of partisan or ideo-
logical loyalties.
But a distinguishing feature of developed democra-
cies is that norms of government transparency and ac-
countability effectively preclude parties from engaging in
extreme targeting of public spending. Indeed, at the in-
dividual level, there is no evidence that FEMA favored
Republican aid applicants over Democrats. Hence, the
article’s theory assumes that a right-wing president can-
not target aid to Republicans and discriminate against
Democrats.
Why does this nonpartisan nature of FEMA aid cause
a partisan disparity in turnout effects? As disaster aid can-
not be targeted to Republicans, a right-wing incumbent
who provides pre-election disaster relief can therefore
credibly develop a reputation among all voters for prior-
itizing disaster aid. This enhanced reputation mitigates a
left-wing voter’s ideological opposition to the incumbent
while augmenting the right-wing voter’s ideological pref-
erence for the incumbent. Consequently, the left-wing
aid recipient has less motivation to vote and expel the
incumbent, while the right-wing recipient has increased
motivation to vote and reelect the incumbent. Hence,
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these dynamics produce the counterintuitive result that
a nonpartisan FEMA aid program actually causes dis-
parate partisan effects on turnout for Republicans and
Democrats.
Finally, this article’s results explain why distributive
spending can simultaneously boost incumbent politi-
cians’ electoral fortunes (e.g., Pacek and Radcliff 1995)
while also decreasing political participation amongmany
recipients (e.g., Soss 1999). Examining cross-country vot-
ing data, Radcliff (1992) and Pacek and Radcliff (1995)
argue that large welfare states may protect incumbent
politicians from being punished during economic busts.
Singer (2011) presents similar findings by examining in-
cumbent vote shares in U.S. state legislative elections.
This article helps to explain why these two observed
effects of welfare—depressed turnout but increased in-
cumbent support—can emerge theoretically when one
accounts for the partisan biases of the beneficiaries of
distributive programs. The delivery of distributive bene-
fits lowers the turnout of voters who were already disin-
clined to support the incumbent government. This lower
turnout among opposition voters effectively increases the
incumbent’s vote share and reelection chances. Hence,
the findings suggest that politicians benefit electorally
even when they deliver aid to voters who are ideologically
opposed.
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